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Abstract. Content-fragile commutative watermarking-encryption requires
that both the content-fragile image signature and the watermarking pro-
cess are invariant under encryption. The pixel entropy, being dependent
on first-order image statistics only, is invariant under permutations. In
the present paper we embed semi-fragile signatures based on pixel en-
tropy by using a histogram-based watermarking algorithm, which is also
invariant to permutations. We also show how the problem of collisions,
i.e. different images having the same signature, can be overcome in this
approach, if embedder and encryptor share a common secret.
Keywords: Commutative Watermarking-Encryption, Content-Fragile Water-
marking, Pixel Entropy.
1 Introduction
Encryption and watermarking are important techniques for the protection of dig-
ital media. While encryption serves to provide confidentiality, watermarks can
be used to provide various security services ranging from integrity protection to
source authentication and copyright protection. Content-fragile (or semi-fragile)
watermarks try to strike the middle ground between exact authentication as
provided by cryptographic hash functions or digital signatures, and robust wa-
termarks that are hard to destroy by any image modification. They are supposed
to survive benign operations like compression, but should be destroyed by mod-
ifications of the image content. In the most common way of content-fragile wa-
termarking, the first step is to compute a content-fragile signature value, which
is to represent the semantics of the image. The content-fragile signature is then
embedded by some robust watermarking scheme. In the verification process, the
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watermark is extracted from the marked image and compared to the signature
value computed from the marked image. Therefore, care must be taken that the
watermarking proces does not influence the signature value. Very often, these
watermarks are applied separately to small image parts, so that content modifi-
cations can be localized.
While there has beem some work in recent years on the problem of combining
watermarking and encryption (CWE, see for example [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], and [8]),
to the best of our knowledge no content-related watermarks commutative with
encryption have been proposed so far. At first glance, however, it seems to be
paradoxical to search for a content-fragile watermark that is commutative with
encryption. After all, the encryption process is supposed to destroy the visual
information from an image, so how can a content-related watermark survive this
operation? However, in the past, there have been attempts to define content-
fragile signatures which only involve first-order statistics of the image, but no
localization information, like the mean histogram value [9] and the pixel en-
tropy [11]. Obviously, this kind of signatures will be invariant under permutation
ciphers. The same is true for watermarking strategies that are purely histogram
based. In order to be able to combine these two approaches, the watermarking
process must not change the histogram in such a way that the content-fragile
signature is affected. This paper presents a feasible way to combine a special
kind of content-related signature and a watermarking algorithm commutative
with permutation ciphers, where the signature is based on the pixel entropy.
A common problem with content-related signatures are collisions, i.e., different
images having the same content-related signature. Particularly if the signature
is based on the histogram alone, collisions are quite easy to find. We show how
this problem can be avoided by involving secret information into the signature
computation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss some
basic properties of the pixel entropy we use in our CWE scheme. Section 3 de-
scribes the watermarking process with its three variants: The localized version is
able to detect and localize content-related changes, the collision-resistant version
trades localization for collision-resistance, and the combined version combines
the features of the former two versions. In Section 4 we discuss commutativity
of the three versions with encryption, and Section 5 gives some experimental
results. Section 6 concludes the paper and gives directions for future research.
2 Properties of Pixel Entropy
In [11], the classical Shannon entropy of an information source [10] is re-defined
as pixel entropy of the color channel c of an input image I:
PE(I, c) =
L∑
k=0
pk · log2(pk), (1)
where pk ia the probability of the grey level k within the color channel c and L
is the maximum pixel value. The pixel entropy has three interesting properties
which make it useful for content-related commutative watermarking-encryption.
Obviously, it is invariant under pixel permutations, meaning it does not change
if the image undergoes a permutation-based cipher (Property 1). It is also in-
variant under permutations of the histogram bins of a colour channel (Property
2), because permuting the hi)stogram bins will permute the order of summation
in (1), but will not change the pixel entropy. This implies that that the pixel
entropy is invariant under the watermarking process described in Section 3.
Finally, the sensitivity of the pixel entropy with respect to changes in the
grey values of single pixels is governed by the total number N of pixels in the
image I (Property 3). In order to verify this, we assume that a single pixel has
changed its grey value from j to i. Then the new probabilities are p˜i =
ni+1
N and
p˜j =
nj−1
N . A direct computation shows that the corresponding change in the
pixel entropy is given by
∆PE =
1
N
(
log
(
ni
nj
)
+ (ni + 1) log
(
1 +
1
ni
)
+ (nj − 1) log
(
1− 1
nj
))
≈ 1
N
(
log
(
ni
nj
)
+
1
ni
+
1
nj
)
, (2)
as log(1 + x) ≈ x for small x.
As mentioned above, content-related signatures can be applied to small subim-
ages to localize content modifications. If the pixel entropy is used for this purpose,
the size of the subimages should be minimized for maximum sensitivity, because
we have no control over ni or nj .
Note that invariance under permutation ciphers does not hold for the second
order pixel entropy,
PE2(I, c) =
L∑
i=0
L∑
j=0
pij · log2(pij), (3)
where pij is the probability of ocurrence of the pair (i, j) of grey values within
the colour channel c, because PE2 is also a function of the pixel’s scanning order.
3 Watermarking Process
The basic watermarking process closely follows the approach taken in [8] and
[7] and is based on the idea of swapping histogram bins according to a secret
watermarking key WK [3]: For each watermark bit wi ∈ {−1, 1}, the algorithm
randomly selects a certain histogram bin ai and another bin bi within a d-
neighbourhood of ai, taking WK as initial seed. Here, d is a fixed parameter
governing the tradeoff between robustness and transparency of the watermark.
Histogram bins of equal height are not selected. Now, if wi = 1, hist(ai) >
hist(bi) should hold, and if wi = −1, hist(ai) < hist(bi) should hold. If this is
not the case, the two bins are swapped. For watermark extraction, the bins at
the positions specified by WK are compared. If a reference watermark is known
before extraction, the authenticity of the image can be verified by computing
the linear correlation of the reference mark and the extracted mark.
Here, a reference mark m is provided by the pixel entropies of the color
channels. For embedding purposes, each pixel entropy is turned into an integer
by first multiplying it by 104 and then quantizing it with a quantization factor q.
More specifically, for a given input image I and colour channel c, the signature
is calculated as follows:
m(I, c) =
[
104 × PE(I, c)
q
]
× q (4)
In the following embedding examples q has been set to 2. The 16 most sig-
nificant bits of m(I, c) are converted into a 16-bit bipolar bitstring w(I, c) and
embedded into the corresponding colour channel c by the procedure described
above. It is important to note that this procedure does not affect the pixel en-
tropy according to Property 2 given in Section 2. After detection, the three
extracted 16-bit integers are concatenated and compared to the concatenated
pixel entropies found in the color channels of the marked image by computing
the linear correlation. An image is deemed unauthentic, if the linear correlation
is below a certain threshold T . Assuming a balanced distribution of the bipolar
bits in w(I, c), the corresponding False Positive probability is [7]:
p(False Positive) =
(
1
2
)N
·
N∑
k=dN2 (T+1)e
(
N
k
)
, (5)
where N is the length of the embedded mark. In what follows, we have set
T = 0.8, while N = 3 × 16 = 48 as discussed above. This gives a false positive
probability of 7.57× 10−10. For a grey-scale image, we have N = 16 and a false
positive probability of 2.59 × 10−4. False negative probabilities, on the other
hand, are notoriously difficult to estimate as it is not clear which attacks are
performed on a marked image.
In what follows, we describe three variants of the general watermarking
scheme described above. While in all variants certain subimages are marked,
the variants differ in the way the subimages are formed.
3.1 Localized Version
The aim of the localized version is to identify subimages where image modifica-
tions have taken place. To this end, square subimages with a side length s are
formed in a regular, non-overlapping fashion, then marked with their respective
pixel entropies. Experience has shown that the minimum subimage size that can
provide meaningful histograms and a sufficient embedding capacity is s = 32.
This size therefore offers the most fine-grained localization of changes and the
highest sensitivity to changes. As an example, the upper row of Figure 1 shows
a plaintext image and the corresponding marked image in the localized version
with a subimage size s = 32. The visual quality of the marked image is assessed
by computing the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and the Structural Sim-
ilarity Index (SSIM, [12]). Next, the marked Lenna image was modified setting
the grey values of 20 random pixels in the area between upper lip and nose to 0.
Figure 1 (c) and (d) show the modified image and verified image, indicating the
two subimages where the modifications have taken place. Specifically, in Figure
1(d), a regular subimage is rendered white if one of the random sub-subimages
yields a correlation value T < 0.8.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1. (a) Original image; (b) Marked image (PSNR 43.82 db, SSIM 0.98); (c) Modified
marked Lenna image; (d) Verified Lenna image.
3.2 Collision-Resistant Version
It is relatively easy to generate collisions, i.e. to generate different images that
have the same pixel entropy. In principle, any permutation of the histogram bins
will produce an image version with the same pixel entropy as the original image.
While most of these permutations will destroy the watermark because embedder
and detector are de-synchronized, the watermarking process can be made robust
against cyclic shifts by a suitable calibration of the embedding and detection
process [7]. In a cyclic shift of the histogram, the grey values of the pixels in the
three colour channels undergo the following transformation:
Pattacked(i, j) = (P (i, j) + x) mod 256, (6)
where x is a positive or negative integer. Due to the wrap-up at the end of the
histogram, cyclic histogram shifting may lead to visible changes of the image
content, as Figure 2 shows, where two subimages of the Lenna image have been
cyclically shifted by an amount of x = 20. The localized version introduced in the
last subsection is unable to detect the different image contents, because of the
unchanged pixel entropy of the subblocks and the robustness of the underlying
watermarking process.
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Fig. 2. (a) Two subimages of the marked Lenna image have been cyclically shifted; (b)
Cyclic shifting goes unnoticed by the detector in the localized version.
In order to cope with the collision problem, some secret information needs
to be introduced into the pixel entropy computation. More specifically, let I be
an original image of size H ×W . We generate an m × n array of subimages of
size s, where m = H/s, n = W/s, by pseudo-randomly choosing pixels from the
original image and assigning them to the subimages in turn, under control of a
secret SplitKey. The resulting subimages are marked separately with their pixel
entropy. After marking, the subimages are merged back to form the watermarked
image. The complete Split-and-Merge process is described in Section 4 in greater
detail, where we investigate its interplay with encryption.
Through the Split process, any local change in the watermarked image will
be randomly distributed over the subimages and lead to corresponding changes
of the pixel entropy, which cannot be foreseen by an attacker, unless she knows
SplitKey. This fact is illustrated in Figure 3, where we compare the correlation
values of the subimages of Figures 1(c) and 2(a) for the localized version and the
collision-resistant version. Because of the distribution over subimages, however,
localization information of changes is lost in this approach. Here, we have used
m = n = 2, but different values for m and n are possible as well, especially if
the original image is not square. In any case, s must be common divisor of H
and W (see Section 5).
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Fig. 3. (a) Detector Responses for modified Lenna image 1(c); (b) Detector Responses
for modified Lenna image 2(a).
3.3 Combined Version
It is possible to combine the virtues of the localized and the collision-resistant
version by splitting the image in a regular fashion first and applying the collision-
resistant approach to the resulting subimages. This means that the subimages
are split again randomly into a 2× 2 array of sub-subimages. If we maintain the
minimum size of s = 32 for the irregular sub-subimages, the regular subimages
have a minimum size of sreg = 64 in the combined version. The modified Lenna
image shown in Figure 4(a), for example, has been split into an 8 × 8 array of
regular subimages of size sreg = 64 each. The subimages were further split into
an 2×2 array of randomly formed sub-subimages which were watermarked after-
wards. Both entropy-preserving and non-entropy preserving image modifications
can be localized on subimage level (see Figure 4).
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. (a) Modified marked Lenna image; (b) Verified Lenna image (Combined Ver-
sion).
4 Commutativity with Encryption
Commutativity of the marking process with encryption means that
M(EK(I),m) = EK(M(I,m)) (7)
holds, where E is the encryption function, K is the encryption key, I is the
plaintext media data, M is the marking function and m is the mark to be
embedded. In the next subsections, we discuss the issue of commutativity with
encryption for the three watermarking variants introduced in Section 3.
4.1 Localized Version
The localized version is commutative to encryption, if the encryption function
E is permutation based and is confined to the same regular subimages of size s
as the watermarking process (see Fig. 5 (a)). In this case, encryption and water-
marking commute at subimage level, because the watermarking process is purely
histogram-based and does not include any components which are changeable by
applying a permutation.
4.2 Collision-Resistant and Combined Version
The collision-resistant version splits the whole image randomly into subimages,
while in the combined version first regular subimages are formed, which are
split randomly afterwards. As both methods differ only in the size of subimages
they are applied to (actually, the collision-resistant version can be seen as an
instance of the combined method using a single large subimage), we can restrict
our discussion to the collision-resistant method.
As in the localized version, one has to make sure, that the watermarking and
encryption processes act on the same subimages. To this end, both marking func-
tionM and encryption function E have to use a common secret SplitKey which
governs the random split process. More specifically, the encryption process has
to include the same Split-and-Merge cycle as the marking process. As embedding
and watermarking are not completely independent of each other anymore in this
case, they may be called quasi-commutative instead.
To check whether encryption and watermarking actually commute if they
share SplitKey, let us go through the encryption and marking processes for an
original image I in detail:
– Encrypt-then-Mark:
A pixel P at position (rI , cI) within I with a pixel value g is selected by the
random number generator and assigned to row rA, column cA in subimage A.
Permuting subimage A sends the pixel to a different position (re, ce) within
A. The merging process will asssign this pixel to some position (i, j) within
I, thus E(I)(i, j) = g. When marking E(I), the split process will first assign
position (i, j) to position (re, ce) within subimage A. Marking A may change
the pixel value to gM , and merging back yields M(E(I))(i, j) = gM .
– Mark-then-Encrypt:
The Split process assigns P to position (rA, cA) within subimage A. Marking
changes P ’spixel value to gM . Merging back into I gives M(I)(rI , cI) =
gM . Encryption assigns this pixel first to (rA, cA) within A by the Split
process and then to (re, ce) by permuting A. Merging back into I yields
E(M(I))(i, j) = gM .
Figure 5 shows the results of appliying a permutation cipher to the marked
subimages for the three described versions of the marking process, i.e. the right-
hand side of Eq. 7. The mark can be extracted from the encrypted image in the
same way as from the plaintext image. In the collision-resistant and combined
versions, however, SplitKey has to be known to the detector as well.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Marked, then encrypted Lenna image: (a) Localized version; (b) Collision re-
sistant version; (c) Combined version.
Note that although only the marked subimages are permuted, the random
process used for splitting into subimages in Figures 5 (b) and (c) distributes the
permutation further into the image. It is clearly visible that there is a tradeoff
between cipher security on one hand (both in terms of key space and opacity of
image features) and sensitivity and the ability to localize image changes on the
other.
5 Experimental Results
In this section we report the results of applying the three versions of the water-
marking process to a set of 25 test images with three different formats, namely
512×768, 768×512 and 512×512. One of the test images is the Lenna image, the
other 24 come from the Kodak true-color image database. As the subimage size
must be a common divisor of height and width of the images, we investigated the
influence of the possible subimages sizes s ∈ {32, 64, 128, 256} on transparency
of the watermark, opacity of the marked, encrypted images and on sensitivity of
the mark with respect to pixel value changes within marked images.
5.1 Visual Quality of Watermarked Images and Effectivity of
Encryption
For Fig. 6, the 25 images of the test set were watermarked by the three variants,
using different values for the subimage size s. The plot shows the resulting SSIM
values, computed by comparing the original image to the watermarked image
and the watermarked encrypted image, respectively. The plotted values have
been averaged over the 25 images in the test set.
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Fig. 6. Average SSIM values for (a) watermarked images and (b) watermarked en-
crypted images with different subimage sizes
All three methods have a very similar visual quality, while the additional
randomization of changes in the collision resistant seems to affect the percepti-
bility of the watermark in a slighty positive way (see Figure 6(a)). Figure 6(b)
confirms the expectation that greater subimage sizes lead to a better conceal-
ment of visual features, as the permutations are applied to larger subimages. In
the collision resistant method, the random split process acts like an additional
permutation of the complete image. Therefore, the subimage size does not affect
the effectiveness of the cipher in this case.
5.2 Sensitivity to Local Changes
Figure 7 shows the average detector responses for the localized and the combined
watermarking methods, using different s-values. More specifically, the minimal
detector response over all subimages is recorded for each image and then averaged
over all images. Here, a watermarked image was modified by altering a number
of pixels p, where 1 ≤ p ≤ 10. In order to make the results as comparable
as possible, the modifications were always done within the same 32 × 32 pixel
subimage.
As predicted theoretically, the sensitivity is generally higher for smaller subim-
age sizes, i.e., the average correlations are lower for smaller subimage sizes. Over-
all, the three methods behave very similarly. For very large subimage sizes, the
watermarking variants are not sensitive enough to small changes to be able to
reliably detect those changes.
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Fig. 7. Average detector responses for watermarked and modified images: (a) Localized
Method; (b) Collision Resistant Method; (c) Combined Method
6 Conclusion
We have presented a way to realize content-related watermarking that is com-
mutative with permutation based encryption. Both the content-related signature
and the watermark are based on first-order statistics and are therefore invari-
ant under permutation ciphers. Moreover, the watermarking process does not
influence the signature. The watermark can therefore embedded into the same
subimages which are authenticated by it. We have identified some fundamental
tradeoffs between collision resistance and cipher security hand and the abil-
ity to locate content changes within the image. Our further research will focus
on the question of robustness of the presented scheme against benign, content-
preserving operations in the plaintext domain.
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